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Abstract: The confession of ‘God, the Father Almighty’ in the Apostles and Nicene 
Creeds, can be interpreted as offering a progressively more focused characterisation 
of the First Person of the Trinity, such that ‘Father’ clarifies the meaning of ‘God’, 
and the force of ‘Almighty’ is controlled by the meaning of ‘Father’.  The results of 
such an exegesis accentuate divine transcendence in way that raises questions about 
theological claims to natural knowledge of God.  More specifically, they suggest that 
the very comprehensiveness of God’s relationship to the world implied by divine 
almightiness blocks any direct line of inference from creation to Creator. 
 
The Apostles and Nicene Creeds both begin with the same affirmation: belief 
in ‘God, the Father almighty’.  Although the Nicene Creed dates only from the fourth 
century, and the Apostles’ Creed is, in its current form, even later, the language of 
‘God, the Father almighty’ is of very ancient vintage, as is shown in part by the very 
fact that these two creeds, which derive from otherwise rather different ecclesial and 
linguistic contexts within the ancient Mediterranean world (viz., eastern Greek and 
western Latin), employ virtually identical terminology.  As the subsequent wording of 
both creeds shows, the focus of this way of identifying the object of Christian faith is 
the affirmation of God’s status as ‘creator of heaven and earth’.  Thus, to speak of 
God as ‘the Father almighty’ is to identify God as the source and ground of all that is 
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not God.1  In this way, the creedal phrase ‘God, the Father almighty’ serves to 
characterise God’s relationship to the world in its entirety, including (to use the more 
expansive language of the Nicene Creed) ‘all that is, seen and unseen’.   
While this ontological claim would seem to render an epistemic connection 
between knowledge of the world and knowledge of God entirely natural, I will argue 
that the all-encompassing character of the creator-creature relation makes any 
inference from world to God problematic.  I will do this by offering an exegesis of the 
phrase, ‘God, the Father almighty’, in which each term is taken in sequence as 
offering a progressively more focused characterisation of the First Person of the 
Trinity.  The point of this exercise is to argue that while the resulting portrait of God 
entails a maximally comprehensive vision of divine involvement in the world, that 
very comprehensiveness renders doubtful the attempt to find evidence for it in the 
everyday course of earthly events.  In short, I will argue that God’s status as creator 
renders creation epistemically opaque with respect to knowledge of God, rendering 
untenable any direct line of inference from creature to Creator, in the form of claims 
that the beauty or order of the world reveal God. 2 
                                                
1 Although the Old Roman Creed lacked the words ‘creator of heaven and earth,’ they 
were arguably superfluous, since ‘where the term ‘Father’ was used’ in the late 
second century ‘the reference was to God in His capacity as Father and creator of the 
universe.’  J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Creeds, 3rd ed. (New York: Continuum, 
1972), p. 136; cf. p. 372.  
2 Throughout this paper I use the English terms ‘almighty’ and ‘omnipotent’ 
interchangeably.  I do this on the grounds that these terms are more familiar and 
idiomatic to English-speakers, though they have the disadvantage of being all too 
easily understood as affirming divine power in the abstract (and so as entailing, e.g., 
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God 
 My claim for the epistemic opacity of creation with respect to God might seem 
to be cast in doubt immediately by two facts: first, that all languages seemingly have 
words for divinity and, second, that Christians have from the church’s earliest days 
routinely appropriated these words to designate the God of Jesus Christ.  It would 
seem legitimate to infer from this practice that Christians have a high degree of 
confidence that there is a natural knowledge of God available to human beings 
everywhere, regardless of their relationship to Jesus, Israel, or the church.  And, of 
course, as a matter of fact most Christians have viewed natural knowledge of God as a 
genuine feature of human experience across different cultures and historical epochs.  
In arguing otherwise, I am adopting a minority position in the tradition.  Nevertheless, 
I do not believe the linguistic fact of the ubiquity of God language is evidence of 
natural knowledge of God.  This is not to say that the fact that God-talk appears 
across human languages and cultures is without significance.  Quite the contrary, the 
fact that God-talk is found in various times and places across cultures does suggest 
something about the way in which the knowledge of God that comes through 
revelation relates to general human habits of speech.3  But I want to argue that this 
                                                                                                                                      
God’s ability to do anything that does not entail a logical contradiction, which is 
generally not something Christians want to affirm).  As noted in the third section of 
this essay below, ‘all-ruler’ is a better translation of the biblical (and Nicene) Greek 
pantokratōr, which casts divine ‘might’ as God’s active sovereignty over all things 
rather than possession of power in the abstract. 
3 I use the term ‘revelation’ to designate what in some theological systems is called 
‘special revelation’, viz., the second-person self-disclosure of the God of Jesus Christ.  
Given that I am arguing that there is no other means of coming to know God (i.e., that 
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relationship is not one in which these generic modes of God-talk reflect an imperfect-
but-genuine (viz., ‘natural’) knowledge of God that might serve as a stepping stone to 
a more perfect knowledge disclosed through revelation; rather, I contend that such 
talk simply marks out the linguistic space where God-talk comes to be located in the 
light of revelation. 
 Although Thomas Aquinas might seem an odd choice of a theologian cited to 
support this claim, I believe that his famous ‘five ways’ are apposite here as a way of 
clarifying the point I want to make.4  While Thomas clearly thinks that the ‘ways’ are 
rational demonstrations,5 he casts them less as the source of logically certain 
conclusions (‘therefore God exists’) than as a series of linguistic observations about 
the logical and phenomenological circumstances that give rise to God-talk (‘this is 
what everybody understands by “God”’ or ‘this is what we call “God”’).6  In light of 
the radical contingency and dependence of the entities that make up our world 
(whether with respect to their origin, development, or end), we are inevitably led to 
reflect on the overarching context that frames our experience of reality as a whole – 
                                                                                                                                      
there is no ‘general revelation’), the modifier is superfluous within the theological 
framework I employ. 
4 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae [hereafter ST] 1.2.3, 60 vols. (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswood, 1964-1981). 
5 For example, he characterizes them as means by which ‘God can be proven 
[probari] to exist’ at the very beginning of the responsio to qu. 2, art. 3 
6 See also ST 1.2.2.2, where Thomas signals that the point of his demonstrations is 
simply to show ‘what we are using the name of the thing to mean’.  
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and there, Thomas argues, is where God-talk emerges.7  From this perspective, ‘God’ 
is arguably not so much an explanatory hypothesis designed to account for particular 
phenomena as an orienting point for reflection on the ontological horizon of human 
experience.8  God can therefore be said to ‘appear’ in the world at the limits of human 
thinking – but only in the sense of a verbal token that marks where our resources for 
speaking dry up, and not in the sense of experiences of God that reveal what (let alone 
who) God is.9  
That Thomas himself maintains a healthy sobriety with respect to the 
possibility of ‘natural’ knowledge of God is shown by how he proceeds after his 
presentation of the five ways.  He introduces the subsequent set of questions in the 
Summa as follows: 
                                                
7 Rowan Williams interprets Thomas as arguing that, ‘the interpretive context that 
holds together the entire realm of causality and dependence is what is generally meant 
by “God.”’  Rowan Williams, The Edge of Words: God and the Habits of Language 
(London: Bloomsbury, 2014), p. 7. 
8 Here Thomas’s own characterization of the five ways as reasoning from effect to 
cause is liable to mislead, as is evident from the common objection that positing God 
as the terminus of the causal chain is arbitrary.  God is ‘cause’ here not as a means of 
accounting for the existence of a particular effect, but rather for the whole system of 
cause-and-effect that marks our experience of the world.  As applied to God, in other 
words, the word ‘cause’ – like every word – must be understood analogically. 
9 ‘God’s effects, therefore, can serve to demonstrate that God exists [demonstrari 
Deum esse], even though they cannot help us to know him comprehensively for what 
he is [ipsum cognoscere secundum suam essentiam].’  Thomas, ST, 1.2.2.3. 
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Having recognized that something exists, we still have to investigate the 
way in which it exists, that we may come to understand what it is that 
exists.  Now we cannot know what God is, but only what he is not; we 
must therefore consider the ways in which God does not exist, rather than 
the ways in which he does.10 
Normally, once it has been determined that something exists, the next step is to 
investigate how it exists, so that we may understand what it is.  But with God this is 
not possible, because God is not ‘something;’ indeed, Thomas argues, though we may 
have determined that God exists, God is such that our only recourse after having 
determined this fact is to problematise it by showing that all further (‘natural’) talk 
about God is justified only insofar as it describes the ways in which God does not 
exist.  In other words, once the semantic space that ‘what everybody understands by 
“God”’ occupies has been identified, there is no possibility for going on from there to 
fill in the content of ‘God.’  Instead, we can do no more than show how the categories 
we normally use to describe existents do not apply to God.  Thus, while it is true that 
God exists, because God does not exist as other entities do, God’s ‘existence’ must be 
distinguished in the sharpest possible way from that of every other existent. 
There is no space here to explore the details of how Thomas goes about 
describing ‘the ways in which God does not exist’.  What counts is the principle that 
identifying the semantic space occupied by ‘God’ does not generate theological data, 
but rather helps clarify the basic point that God cannot be known in the way that other 
entities are known (i.e., as some thing that can be distinguished from other 
somethings).  For this reason, the recognition that ‘God’ delimits a semantic space for 
God-talk does not mean that natural theology identifies a God-shaped hole in human 
                                                
10 Thomas, ST, vol. 2, p. 19; translation slightly altered. 
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experience that is later filled by revelation.  Because God’s ‘existence’ is such that 
God cannot be ranged alongside other entities as one more object in a general 
inventory, ‘what everybody understands by “God”’ is not a hypothetical reality (like 
luminiferous ether or the Higgs boson) whose reality could be confirmed or 
disconfirmed by the acquisition of more data.  The semantic space identified by 
Thomas in qu. 2 of the Summa is, correspondingly, best interpreted not as a window 
on the divine, but as a point of reference for places where human experience breaks 
down as a source of knowledge.11  As Rowan Williams put it in his recent Gifford 
Lectures, if  ‘what everybody understands by “God”’ refers to that which addresses 
certain fundamental difficulties or aporias of human experience, then revelation ‘does 
not fill a gap, but shows why the gap is there.’12  That Christian God-talk inserts itself 
in this gap (i.e., just at the point where ‘everybody’ uses the word ‘God’) therefore 
does not imply continuity between revealed knowledge and general human experience 
of the world.  On the contrary, precisely because God is not the kind of entity that 
                                                
11 Just to be clear, I am not claiming that Thomas himself would put it this way, since 
he explicitly frames the viae as demonstrations that God exists.  But given his own 
emphasis on the strongly analogical nature of the term ‘God’ (see, e.g., his discussion 
of how the pagan and Christian both do and do not mean the same thing by ‘God’ in 
ST 1.13.10), there is a case to be made for a minimalist interpretation of the 
demonstrative force of the viae along the lines I propose. 
12 Williams, The Edge of Words, p. 180.  He explains, ‘A natural theology does not 
deliver either a theory or a vision of the sacred; it identifies where our thinking and 
speaking about our thinking and speaking come to the point where we either 
acknowledge an inescapable halting point or begin to re-work the style of our 
questions.’ 
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could fill any kind of gap in our understanding of the world, revelation necessarily 
functions as a judgment of our ‘natural’ God-talk by a God who cannot be assigned a 
place in any categorical scheme and just so offends our ‘natural’ sense of the divine.  
Even if it is possible a posteriori to identify some linguistic connections between our 
natural forms of God-talk and God as God reveals God’s self to be, in the event of 
revelation the reality of God invariably challenges our ideas of what God is like. 
The Father 
Admittedly, the fact that the term ‘God’ is used for God, and that obvious 
similarities exist between specifically Christian talk about God and ‘what everybody 
understands by “God”’ can seem to make the question of whether revelation is an 
interruption or a fulfilment of human beings’ ‘natural’ God-talk far less clear cut than 
I have been arguing.  Consider the following parallel: even if I had for many years 
mistakenly identified an imposter as the Grand Duchess Anastasia, the discovery of 
the truth need not entail a wholesale revision of my understanding of the meaning of 
‘the Grand Duchess Anastasia’.  Now, it is arguable that at least some (if not most) 
converts to Christianity act as though acceptance of the God of Jesus Christ stands in 
a similar relation to their previous understandings of God: entailing the verdict that 
their previous beliefs were indeed false in certain respects, but not only or altogether 
false.13  In order to show why I would still maintain that discontinuity between natural 
and revealed knowledge of God should be stressed, I will turn from the Summa 
                                                
13 Notwithstanding my own use of Thomas above, he is clearly far more inclined to 
stress continuity between natural and revealed knowledge of God than I am.  See, e.g., 
the way in which he uses the comparatives plures and excellentiores to describe the 
relationship between the knowledge of God provided by revelation and that attained 
by natural reason in ST 1.12.13.1.  
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Theologiae to Anselm’s Proslogion to argue that genuine knowledge of God is 
necessarily rooted in second-person encounter (i.e., the direct address of revelation) 
rather than third-person observation or inference. 
With respect to the particulars of Anselm’s argument, my contention is that to 
view God as ‘that which exists in the mind only’ – the possibility that Anselm 
disallows – is precisely to treat God in the third person, as an object of speculative or 
generalised knowledge.  Anselm’s point is that to think of God (and only of God, 
insofar as God is ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’) in such terms 
constitutes a category error.  It amounts to confusing God with one’s idea of God (i.e., 
that which exists in the mind), and this confusion is fatal, because however orthodox 
ones ideas about God may be, they are problematic insofar as they invariably lead one 
to conceive of God as an object alongside other objects (for such is the nature of 
‘conceiving’).14  From this perspective, one upshot of Anselm’s argument is that 
while third-person language about God is unavoidable, it is inherently problematic, 
because we only think (and speak) rightly of God on the basis of knowing God as the 
one before whom we stand, by whom we are called to account, and who, because only 
knowable in that way, cannot self-consistently be contemplated as possibly existing or 
not existing.  Here I think it is worth noting that the Proslogion itself is cast in the 
form of a prayer to God – that is, as second-person address by one who is intensely 
conscious of always standing before God.  To know God in this framework is thus to 
recognise that one may never treat God as a hypothetical entity, but only as the One to 
whom we have to answer rather than the reverse.  It is this understanding of the 
                                                
14 Thus, in spite of Thomas’s well-known rejection of Anselm’s argument in ST, 
1.2.2.1, Thomas is arguably making a point similar to Anselm’s in his insistence that 
we can know only the ways in which God does not exist.  
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conditions of genuine knowledge of God that demands that in articulating the 
relationship between natural and revealed theology, language of fulfillment take a 
back seat to language of judgment: being encountered by God in the second person 
always disrupts our reflections on God in the third person, because it necessarily 
shows that the latter by their very grammar draw us away from God (cf. Job 42:5). 
The point here is not that only second-person talk about God is allowed (in 
which case this very essay would be an illegitimate exercise).  We are certainly 
commanded to pray without ceasing (1 Thess. 5:17), but that does not mean that 
human activity is exhausted by prayer.  Nor is it the case that objective knowledge of 
God is impossible, for as we are material creatures who know anything only as it 
confronts us in time and space, God’s confronting us in the second person entails 
God’s taking objective form, whether a burning bush, enhypostatized humanity, or the 
preached word.  My point is only that all third-person statements, if made in the 
knowledge that the God who graciously takes objective form for us is never reducible 
to an object in the world, are parasitic on second-person encounter and thus can be 
true (as Thomas recognised) only by analogy.  It is certainly possible to speak 
truthfully about God in the third person – but only in the recognition that even truthful 
third-person statements will mislead if treated like grammatically isomorphic 
statements about created entities. 
Turning back now to the creedal phrase, ‘God, the Father almighty,’ to 
encounter someone in the second person is to understand that entity as a who – that is, 
precisely as someone in addition to something – and thus as bearing a name.  The 
shift from ‘God’ to ‘Father’ in the creeds marks just this move from third-person to 
second-person knowledge.  For while it is true that in the Old Testament God is 
occasionally described as ‘father’ in the generic sense (see, e.g., Isa. 63:16; 64:8; Jer. 
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3:19; 31:9l; Mal. 1:6; 2:10; cf. John 8:41), the creedal designation of God as ‘Father’ 
is quite distinct from this sort of usage.  It derives from Jesus’ practice of addressing 
Israel’s God in the second person as ‘Father’ (see, e.g., Matt. 11:25; Mark 14:36; 
Luke 23:34, 46; John 11:31; 12:27) – a practice taken up by early Christians on the 
grounds of their having been brought by grace into the same filial relationship with 
God that Jesus enjoyed by nature (see Rom. 8:15; Gal. 4:6; cf. John 20:17).  In this 
context, ‘Father’ is not a mere metaphor, but a name.15  Thus, to speak of God as ‘the 
Father’ is not to offer a shorthand evaluation of God’s character or qualities, but to 
pick out or identify a particular entity as God.  In short, the Christian designation of 
God as ‘Father’ is not in the first instance an answer to the question, ‘What is God 
like?’ but rather, ‘Who is God?’ 
At the same time, this name also does in fact provides information about the 
character of the divine life.  For ‘Father’ is a relative term: God is ‘Father’ (and, 
indeed, ‘our Father’) because he is ‘Father of our Lord Jesus Christ’ (Eph. 1:3).  So 
even though ‘Father’ is not properly understood as a projection on to the divine of the 
best features of human fatherhood (quite the contrary according to Eph. 3:15), God’s 
status as Father is nevertheless genuinely descriptive: it tells us something about how 
                                                
15 See, e.g., Gregory of Nyssa, Against Eunomius, 11.5; Thomas, ST, 1.31.2.  For an 
analysis of the way in which the development of the Trinitarian language of Father, 
Son, and Spirit was bound up with Christian consciousness of the Tetragrammaton as 
the divinely given name of God, see R. Kendall Soulen, Distinguishing the Voices, 
vol. 1 of The Divine Name(s) and the Holy Trinity (Louisville: Westminster John 
Knox, 2011), especially chapters 2-3. 
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as well as who God is.16  Most centrally, if God is eternally Father, then it follows (as 
Athanasius was fond of pointing out) that the one in relation to whom God is 
(eternally) Father is – equally eternally – Son.  The designation ‘Father’ therefore 
marks God as inherently generative: quite apart from and prior to creation, God gives 
life (see John 5:26; 17:5).  Indeed, because God’s status as Father (viz., the One who 
gives life to the Son) is eternal, the giving of life is integral to God’s being Father – 
and thus as also of God’s being as the Trinity of Father, Son, and Spirit.  The God 
who is Father therefore cannot be identified with an eternally self-enclosed Unmoved 
Mover in the Aristotelian sense; God is rather inherently expansive, living as God by 
giving rise to and subsisting in relation with another.  Moreover, far from being 
threatened by this eternal and infinite giving of divine being to another, the Father is 
God precisely as in giving himself away by begetting the Son and breathing forth the 
Spirit. 
Furthermore, although the Father’s productivity is integral to his identity as 
Father, it is not an automatic or mechanical process.  Quite the contrary, the fact that 
the creeds identify God in the first instance as Father (and not as First Cause or Prime 
Mover) serves as a reminder that the divine generativity is also personal.  God is 
inherently Father, but this status is not a limit on but rather an expression of God’s 
freedom, such that God is rightly characterized as love (1 John 4:1, 16), and thus as 
inherently personal.  Of course, the New Testament also describes as ‘spirit’ (John 
4:24) and ‘light’ (1 John 1:5), but while these terms are evocative of God’s status as 
                                                
16 Indeed, in line with the ancient definition of the divine persons or hypostases as 
tropoi hyparxeōs, or ‘modes of being’, we may go so far as to say that ‘Father’ tells us 
how God is precisely as it tells us who God is.  Cf. Thomas, ST, 1.40.1: ‘the “what” 
and the “by what” of divine being do not differ’ (my translation). 
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living and present, love qualifies the character of this living presence personally as 
pertaining to an agent who is generous, and whose divinity is thus most properly 
understood as inherently empowering rather than oppressive.17   
Within the context of the life of the Trinity, therefore, the love of the Father 
for the Son clarifies that the productivity of the Father takes the form of gift.  Again, 
one upshot of this claim is that the life of the Trinity is not an impersonal or automatic 
process.  Rather, God is divine insofar as God is the Father, who begets the Son in the 
power of the Spirit.  In this respect, it is entirely appropriate (and not at all a sign of 
any intratrinitarian subordinationism) that the creeds should identify God first and 
principally as Father, since it is the eternal, boundless, and inexhaustible self-giving 
of the Father that is the root of God’s Trinitarian life.18  To be sure, the love of the 
Father is eternally answered by that of the Son in the Spirit, and it is just in and as that 
tripersonal reality that God is love.19  And yet the Father remains (in the language of 
                                                
17 See Ian A. McFarland, From Nothing: A Theology of Creation (Louisville, KY: 
Westminster John Knox, 2014), ch. 2. 
18 In this context, it is worth remembering that Thomas specifies the Father as 
principle (principium) rather than cause (causa) of divinity, since ‘with regard to 
every sort of cause, we invariably discover a disparity based on perfection or power 
between the cause and that of which it is the cause.  But we use the word “principle” 
even with regard to matters wherein there is no such difference, but merely one based 
on some sort of order’ (ST 1.33.1.1).  In short, for Thomas ‘“Principle” secures an 
order without priority.’ John Baptist Ku, God the Father in the Theology of St. 
Thomas Aquinas (New York: Peter Lang, 2013), p. 146. 
19 Katherine Sonderegger’s efforts to define God as love without reference to 
specifically Trinitarian considerations strike me as unpersuasive.  While she is right to 
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the Cappadocians) the monas archē or sole origin of that loving generativity that is 
the Trinity.  In this respect, it is possible to affirm the Father as the principle not only 
of the persons, but of the Godhead as such; indeed, the Father ‘is understood to be the 
principle of the whole divinity because he is the principle of all the divine persons’.20  
So while there is no Father (and no Trinity) apart from the Son and the Spirit, the Son 
and the Spirit (and thus the Trinity as such) subsist only through the Father’s free and 
loving gift of divinity.  
In this way my earlier claim that God is not properly spoken of in the third 
person finds its roots in the very life of the Godhead, where God lives only, so to 
speak, in the second person, as one-with-another in love.  God is not one in monadic 
solitariness, but as the life of the Father who loves the Son in the Spirit, and who, in 
turn, is the recipient of the Son’s love in the Spirit’s power.  That is, God lives as one 
who eternally addresses a second as a thou and is thereby addressed as a thou in 
return, with this mutual love eternally witnessed and shared by the Spirit, through 
whom the Father glorifies the Son and the Son the Father.  Insofar as we know God 
only as we know (by virtue of having been called to share) this love, we glorify (and 
                                                                                                                                      
point out that talk of love between the divine persons invariably raises the spectre of 
tritheism, her attempt to draw a conceptual parallel between love and fragility (viz., 
an inherent property that need never be manifested) fails because the analogue to 
fragility is not divine love (which is, willy-nilly, an action), but divine lovableness or 
(invoking the classic equation of the good as that which is desirable) goodness.  See 
Katherine Sonderegger, Doctrine of God, vol. 1 of Systematic Theology (Minneapolis 
Fortress Press, 2015), pp. 479-90. 
20 Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum Magistri Petri Lombardi, 1, 
d. 15; cited in Ku, God the Father in St. Thomas Aquinas, p. 145; cf. ST, 1.39.5.6. 
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thereby confess) God rightly in making joyous and grateful response to God’s call to 
us through our own in second-person address to God in praise and prayer – one 
dimension of which is the confession of God as ‘almighty’.21 
Almighty 
 Throughout much of Christian history, the creedal designation of the Father as 
‘almighty’ was taken as unproblematic.  In the modern period, however, it has 
become more common to see the two terms as standing in some tension.  Either the 
all-encompassing power suggested by the term ‘almighty’ is rejected (especially by 
process theologians) as fundamentally incompatible with the character of God as a 
loving Father, or, contrariwise, it is seen (especially by Christian and post-Christian 
feminists) as re-enforcing the worst elements of patriarchy by exposing ‘Father’ as a 
cipher for the selfish, oppressive, and arbitrary exercise of power over and against 
others.  In either case, the language of almightiness or omnipotence is criticized for 
implying that divine power is exercised in a unilateral mode that either resists or 
overwhelms the power of creatures.  Since love entails mutuality, it is argued, and 
since almightiness is incompatible with even the possibility of the give-and-take 
characteristic of genuine mutuality, a God who is ‘almighty’ cannot be ‘Father,’ too – 
or at least not a loving one. 
  It is important to concede that this line of criticism does identify a genuine 
problem with the term, ‘almighty,’ which can indeed be misappropriated as a 
                                                
21 Although I lack space to develop the point here, even as the Son’s glorifying of the 
Father is inseparable from the Spirit, so the role of the Spirit in our individual 
responses to the Father’s love, insofar as they, too, are mediated by the Spirit (Rom. 
8:15-16) are inseparable from the common life of the church, in and through which 
the Spirit calls and gathers us as God’s children (1 Cor. 12:13). 
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designation for limitless, arbitrary power.22  But the reading of the creedal language 
that I am proposing here does not treat the pairing of ‘Father’ and ‘almighty’ as the 
juxtaposition of two equiprimordial terms, but reads them in a definite order of super- 
and subordination.  God is Father first of all, and only as Father is almighty as well.  
The meaning of the latter term must therefore be controlled by the former, such that 
while we can (and, I will argue, must) confess God as ‘almighty’, we can do so 
faithfully only as a specification of the more fundamental claim that God is Father. 23 
 This claim for the priority of ‘Father’ over ‘almighty’ is justified by attention 
to their place in the Christian doctrine of God.  Again, ‘Father’ refers to God’s 
intrinsic and eternal personal identity, apart from God’s external acts in creation.  By 
contrast, ‘almighy’, the English translation of the biblical pantokratōr (Rev. 1:8; 4:8; 
11:17 and passim), should be taken as referring to God’s lordship over the creation 
(i.e., all that which is other than God) and not as an affirmation of divine power in the 
                                                
22 ‘The man who calls ‘the Almighty’ God misses God in the most terrible way. For 
the ‘Almighty’ is bad, as ‘power in itself’ is bad. The ‘Almighty’ means Chaos, Evil, 
the Devil. We could not better describe and define the Devil than by trying to think 
this idea of a self-based, free, sovereign ability.’ Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 
trans. G. T. Thompson (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 48. 
23 Jean-Pierre Batut shows that this ordering emerged only gradually in the early 
church, as Christians struggled to integrate the ‘cosmological’ and ‘Trinitarian’ senses 
of Father in such a way that the Trinitarian sense of ‘Father’ (viz., its status as a 
name) was understood to have precedence over the cosmological term pantokratōr.  
Jean-Pierre Batut, Pantocrator: «Dieu le Père tout-puissant» dans la théologie 
prénicéenne (Paris: Institut d’Études Augistiniennes, 2009), pp. 61-63; cf. 57. 
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abstract.24  In other words, while God is ‘Father’ in se, God is ‘almighty’ only 
relatively – with respect to that which is other than God.  For God does not rule over 
God’s self: if there is a precedence with respect to intratrinitarian order of the Father 
with respect to the Son and the Spirit, there is no ruling of the Father over the other 
two divine persons, who insofar as they possess from the Father the fullness of the 
Father’s divinity, are every bit as ‘almighty’ as the Father.25 
 It may not seem at first glance that restricting the import of the term 
‘almighty’ to the Father’s relationship to the world is terribly helpful in avoiding the 
spectre of an arbitrary and tyrannical God.  Here again, however, the answer to this 
concern is to remember that the might in question is that of the Father, whose eternal 
identity consists precisely in giving all that he has – or, better, all that he is – to the 
Son.  Insofar as the creeds state that it is precisely as Father that God is almighty and 
(therefore) Creator, they imply that divine might – and the work of creation that 
springs from it – is grounded in the love by which the Father eternally and 
inexhaustibly begets the Son.  In short, the confession that the Father is almighty ad 
                                                
24 Cf. note 2 above.  According to Dionysius the Areopagite (Divine Names, 10), God 
is call pantokratōr because ‘he preserves and embraces all the world.  He founds it.  
He makes it secure.  He holds it together.’  Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Works, 
trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1987), p. 119.  
25 See, e.g., Thomas, ST, 1.33.1.2.  Cf. Maximus the Confessor, Disputation with 
Pyrrhus, PG 91:324A-B: ‘obedience is not a property of God but of human beings, as 
the divine Gregory [of Nazianzus] says…. “God is neither obedient nor disobedient, 
for such matters pertain to subordinates and those under authority”’. 
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extra, far from being in tension with the Father’s love ad intra, derives from it.26  
Indeed, if almightiness is interpreted in a more restricted sense to mean only that the 
Father’s action is all-encompassing (rather than all-controlling), then it is possible to 
say that the Father is intrinsically almighty insofar as in giving away all that he is to 
the Son, he sustains and ‘contains’ the Son – but, precisely by virtue of the fullness of 
the gift, only in such a fashion that the Son also ‘contains’ the Father in return (John 
14:10-11).  The almightiness of God in creation is an external analogue of this 
intratrinitarian structure.  Although there is no creaturely containment of God 
analogous to the Son’s reciprocal ‘containment’ of the Father, it remains the case that 
even as within the Godhead the mutual life of the persons is rooted in the free and 
unlimited gift of the Father’s being to the Son in the Spirit, so the being of creatures 
in the world reflects the Father’s free and unstinting gift of being through the Son in 
the Spirit.27   
This Trinitarian framing of God’s creative work, in turn, grounds the world’s 
existence exclusively in the love of God in a manner consistent with the doctrine of 
creation from nothing: just as there is no other factor than the Father’s love for the 
Son in the Spirit that underlies the Trinity, so there is no factor other than the love of 
                                                
26 So Batut argues (Pantocrator, p. 466) that patristic accounts of creation in the 
Logos imply that ‘le secret ultime de l’existence de l’univers…n’est autre que la 
coïncidence, au plus intime de la vie divine, de la toute-puissance et l’amour.’ 
27 The gift of being to creatures is not unlimited, because creatures are less than God: 
for God to give being without limit to creatures (as the Father does to the Son) would 
make them divine and not creatures; nevertheless, it is unstinting, since its limitations 
are not due to any begrudging of being on God’s part, but only to the fact that God 
constitutes them as creatures, and thus as finite. 
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the Father for the Son in the Spirit that underlies the being of creatures.  In this way, 
the idea creation from nothing, understood as a corollary of the specifically 
Trinitarian confession of God as almighty, means that the life of creatures is 
constituted and conditioned by nothing but God.28  That the Father is ‘almighty’ does 
not, therefore, mean that all might is reserved to God alone, but rather that all might 
derives from God alone.  Because the almighty God is the Father who eternally gives 
all to the Son in the power of the Spirit, might (power) is emphatically not a quality 
that God begrudges to others.  On the contrary, the work of creation is precisely that 
by which God gives might to that which is not God – echoing the intratrinitarian 
process by which the Father gives infinite might to the Son and the Spirit.   
Two points follow from this understanding of creation.  First, even as the life 
of the Son, far from threatening the Father’s divinity, establishes it, so the existence of 
no creature, from the smallest subatomic particle to the highest of the seraphim, can in 
any sense constitute a threat to God’s power.  Instead, a creature’s existence, 
whatever form it takes, cannot logically be anything but (to those who, having come 
to know God through revelation, have eyes to see) a witness to God’s power, since 
God is at every point of every creature’s existence the sole ground of its being in 
every respect.  Within the logic of creation from nothing, even revolt against God is 
possible only as a creature’s capacities are enabled by God.   
Second (and conversely), the Father’s ‘almightiness’ cannot be understood as 
constituting a possible threat to the integrity of the creature, since whatever being and 
activity a creature has, it has only by the continuous gift of God in the first place.  
Since God’s will in making creatures is precisely that they should flourish as the 
                                                
28 For a more extensive discussion of this point, see McFarland, From Nothing, pp. 
87-91. 
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particular sorts of creatures they are by God’s continual gift of being to them, it is a 
contradiction in terms to suppose that distance from or independence from God could 
be a possible condition of creatures’ flourishing: any such distance or independence 
could only mean the creature’s destruction.  That (rational) creatures do, inexplicably, 
seek such independence indicates a failure to recognize the very conditions of the 
possibility of their existing at all: in rebelling against God, they violate God’s will for 
their own being and thereby make it impossible for themselves to be.  Even here, 
however, that they can undertake such acts is itself possible only by virtue of God’s 
first granting and then enabling their own characteristic ways of being and acting 
(viz., as free and responsible agents).29   
The very comprehensiveness of God’s work in sustaining and empowering 
creatures confirms the impossibility of drawing any line of inference from our 
experience of creation to knowledge of God.  Since all creatures are equally and 
absolutely dependent on God for every aspect of their existence and at every point of 
                                                
29 Based on the logic of divine omnipotence outlined here, the failure of creatures to 
flourish – to experience their being and exercise their capacities fully – constitutes a 
far more serious threat to divine sovereignty than any manifestation of creatures’ 
capacity for life, movement, and being.  In other words, it is in the face of evil that the 
confession of the Father as ‘almighty’ arguably chafes against reality.  While there is 
no space here to explore these issues, I would make two points: 1) failure to flourish 
that is the result of moral evil (i.e., the wilfully perverse acts of rational creatures) is a 
genuine problem, and 2) failure to flourish connected with what is traditionally named 
natural evil is arguably more difficult to identify, since the circumstances of 
creaturely finitude dictate that temporal limits to creatures’ flourishing cannot as such 
be equated with a failure to flourish. 
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their existence, no aspect of created reality can in itself provide any privileged line of 
access to the divine.  Nor can the structure of the created order as a whole serve this 
purpose.  Because God transcends all creatures, whether considered individually or as 
a collective, to the same, infinite degree, one can no more ascend to God via the 
experience of any particular set of natural phenomena than that Esther Summerson 
might infer the existence of Charles Dickens based on her experience of the novelistic 
world of Bleak House.30  The connection between God and the world, like that 
between the author and his novel, is visible only to one who has a view of both – and 
that is something we do not have – except insofar as God provides that perspective by 
revealing God’s self within creation.  Otherwise, creation remains opaque to God, not 
because God is distant from it, but precisely because God’s all-compassing relation to 
the world as ‘the Father almighty’ precludes the creature acquiring any point of 
epistemic leverage over against the Creator. 
Conclusion  
This concern brings me back to the question of the discernment of God’s 
power in creation more generally.  I began this paper by calling into question whether 
the cultural ubiquity of God-talk provides any evidence for the discernment of the 
God of Jesus Christ apart from revelation.  I went on to argue that the idea of any talk 
about God divorced from revelation is problematic, since it cuts against the properly 
second-person structure of human knowledge of God.  It also confirms what I have 
referred to as creation’s epistemic opacity to God.  But in light of Paul’s claim that 
                                                
30 Might not Esther reflect on the existence of a Creator God based on her experience 
of that world?  Of course she might.  But (to refer back to the first two sections of this 
essay) whatever ‘God’ she might imagine would not be Charles Dickens. 
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God’s eternal power is, in fact, ‘clearly perceived in the things that have been made’ 
(Rom. 1:20), some further discussion of the point is called for.   
The central factor to be taken into account when reflecting on this question is 
God’s transcendence: because God is not one item among others in the world and thus 
not properly conceived in the third person, there can be no progression from ‘the 
things that have been made’ to God, because ‘things that have been made’ can, by 
their very character as finite realities located in space and time, lead us only to other 
such things.  Here Thomas’s second objection in qu. 2 of the Summa to the 
proposition that there is a God is relevant: ‘it seems that everything we observe in this 
world can be fully accounted for by other causes, without assuming a God’.31  
Thomas’s efforts to answer this objection by appealing to the Aristotelian principle 
that natural causes have a purpose that require reference to a higher cause are 
unpersuasive. Precisely because God’s purpose in creating is simply that the creation 
should be, the sequence of created causes entails no intrinsic referent to some higher 
purpose or end – and, indeed, trying to find one is arguably to resort to an 
instrumentalisation of non-human creatures in particular that has rightly become the 
focus of much criticism of traditional forms of the doctrine of creation.  Because it is 
rooted in a transcendent Creator, who relates to all creatures with equal immediacy 
and directness as their source and ground, the divine causal presence in creation 
inherently invisible.  That creation is opaque to God apart from revelation is not, 
however, a defect, but part of its glory as that which by God’s creating and sustaining 
grace has its own integrity as a system of causes and effects that in its own proper 
completeness does not require reference to a higher power in order to be understood.  
                                                
31 Thomas, ST, 1.2.3.2. 
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In this way, as Katherine Sonderegger notes, contemporary atheism ‘testifies to the 
truth of the One God, his invisible Deity and Power’.32 
To be sure, the fact that God-talk is seemingly ubiquitous gives some credence 
to the idea that people everywhere ‘knew God’ (Rom. 1:21), but it is precisely in the 
context of that sociological fact that I would like to interpret Paul.  Yes (and as 
Thomas also saw), people everywhere talk about ‘God’ on the basis of their 
experience of the world, but this ‘knowledge’ is such that people invariably ‘became 
futile in their thinking’ (to continue Paul’s own line of argument in Romans 1), as 
shown by the universal human failure to ‘honour [God] as God.’  Instead, they 
invariably confuse God with some lesser reality, whether that be with the concrete 
forms of ‘mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles’ (Rom. 1:23) or with more 
abstract notions of first cause, unmoved mover, or most perfect being in what remains 
a worldly matrix of cause and effect. 
Here the manifold perplexities of creaturely finitude and even the intractable 
mystery of moral evil may actually be a help in clarifying the limits of God-talk.  The 
world we experience may certainly be an occasion for affectionate and awesome 
wonder, but it may just as easily serve as an occasion for revulsion and horror – as 
various ‘Gnostic’ movements that have always been found at the periphery of the 
Christian tradition attest.  I can think of no way of adjudicating between these two 
visions of the world based on human experience: the presumption that wonder 
necessarily trumps horror has to me little credibility in the face of the depths of pain 
and alienation suffered by so many of our own species, let alone the varied and to us 
largely impenetrable experiences of other creatures.  What we hold to as Christians 
are not (third-person) speculative ideas about the character of the world and its 
                                                
32 Sonderegger, Doctrine of God, p. 53. 
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putative Demiurge, but the (second-person) claim of the One who has promised us 
that ‘nothing…in all creation will be able to separate us from the love of God [shown 
forth] in Christ Jesus our Lord’ (Rom. 8:39).  Such a promise can only be made 
credibly by a God who is almighty, that is, by one who, as the sole condition of our 
own existence and the existence of everything else that is, cannot be checked in the 
fulfilment of the divine will by any competing power whose ontological independence 
would place it outside of the divine sovereignty. 
There is a paradox in what Paul claims in Rom. 1:20.  For he identifies ‘the 
eternal power and deity’ that he holds to be ‘clearly perceived in the things that have 
been made precisely with God’s ‘invisible nature.’  It has long been customary among 
Christians to identify this perception of the invisible with a movement from 
phenomenal effect to transcendent cause, but, again, this seems to me a category 
error, for I see no compelling way of moving securely from the phenomenal to the 
transcendent, since the phenomenal only yields further phenomena.33  By contrast, to 
know God as inherently invisible – indeed, to recognise with Paul that that which can 
be ‘known’ of God in the world is precisely God’s invisibility – is to know God not as 
the answer to any question we might pose (like, say, ‘Why is there something rather 
                                                
33 This account of movement from cause to effect may appear too narrowly conceived 
in terms of efficient causation, ignoring the possibility that one might view beauty, for 
example, as allowing a different mode of inference to the divine.  But even Hans Urs 
von Baltasar, for all his emphasis on the continuity between created and divine 
beauty, understands this continuity to be visible only in light of revelation, and not as 
grounds for any direct inference from natural beauty to its transcendent analogue.  To 
be sure, appreciation of creaturely beauty disposes us to recognise the divine – but the 
latter recognition is possible only on God’s (second-person) initiative. 
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than nothing?), but rather as the One whom comes to be known in questioning us (by 
asking, ‘Will you accept that you and the world you inhabit are something rather than 
nothing?’).  To those who attend to this question – and to the promise implied by it – 
God’s eternal power and deity are indeed perceived precisely in their invisibility: not 
as something that can be grasped with the intellect any more than with the eyes, but as 
that which may be seized in faith and hope as sustaining every part of creation at 
every moment and drawing it inexorably – despite the impediments that we may see 
before us – to the good that God intends for all that God has made. 
